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« Émergence insoumise s'ouvre sur un souvenir de l'autrice qui attend un taxi après un colloque : « Non, mais croyez-vous vraiment que moi, une femme des Premières Nations, je vais aller attendre seule le soir, à Val-d'Or? » Ces mots, adressés au gardien qui lui indique que les portes de l'université sont sur le point de fermer, seront le catalyseur d'une réflexion sur le sort réservé aux femmes autochtones, aussi bien dans le milieu carcéral que dans la société canadienne en général. Alternant entre les réminiscences personnelles et les analyses du racisme systémique afin d'aller au-delà des statistiques et des préjugés, cet essai de Cyndy Wylde s'inscrit dans une tradition de littérature de combat, qui bouscule les idées reçues et dynamite le confort et l'indifférence. »

Two decades ago, Tarana Burke started using the phrase ‘me too’ to release victims of sexual abuse and rape from their shame and to empower girls from minority communities. In 2017, actress Alyssa Milano made the hashtag #MeToo go viral. This article’s concern is with the role of testimonial practices in the context of sexual violence. While many feminists have claimed that the word of those who claim to being sexually violated by others (should) have political and/or epistemic priority, others have failed to recognize the harm and injury of instances of sexual violence that are not yet acknowledged as such and failed to listen to victims from marginalized social groups. In fact, some feminists have attacked #MeToo for mingling accounts of ‘proper’ sexual violence and accounts that are not ‘proper’ experiences of sexual violence. My aim in this article is to show why this critique is problematic and find a philosophically fruitful way to understand the #MeToo-movement as a movement that strives for moral and conceptual progress.

« Par quel étrange paradoxe le contrat social, censé instituer la liberté et l'égalité civiles, a-t-il maintenu les femmes dans un état de subordination ? Pourquoi, dans le nouvel ordre social, celles-ci n'ont-elles pas accédé, en même temps que les hommes, à la condition d'« individus » émancipés ? Les théories du contrat social, héritées de Locke et de Rousseau, et renouvelées depuis Rawls, ne peuvent ignorer les enjeux de justice que soulève le genre. Carole Pateman montre, dans cet ouvrage désormais classique, que le passage de l'ordre ancien du statut à une société moderne du contrat ne marque en rien la fin du patriarcat. La philosophe met ainsi au jour l'envers refoulé du contrat social : le « contrat sexuel », qui, via le partage entre sphère privée et sphère publique, fonde la liberté des hommes sur la domination des femmes. Il s'agit là moins d'exploitation que de subordination, comme le démontre l'autrice en analysant le contrat de mariage, mais aussi l'ensemble des contrats touchant à la propriété de la personne, de la prostitution à la maternité de substitution, jusqu'à l'esclavage et au salariat. Ainsi s'engage, à partir du féminisme, une critique de la philosophie politique libérale dans son principe même : pour Carole Pateman, un ordre social libre ne peut en aucun cas être de type contractuel. »-- Quatrième de couverture.

Les affrontements politiques actuels de la « guerre contre le terrorisme » illustrent que l'interaction au sein et entre les civilisations dites occidentales et moyen-orientales est en constante évolution. Un thème récurrent est cependant la façon dont l'Islam et les musulman.e.s signifient « l'Ennemi » dans l'imaginaire socioculturel occidental et sont devenu.e.s « l'Autre » contre lequel l'Occident s'identifie. Dans un mélange unique et perspicace de théorie raciale critique, féministe et postcoloniale, Sunera Thobani examine comment l'islam est à la base de la formation de l'identité occidentale à des moments critiques de son histoire, y compris les croisades, la Reconquista et la période coloniale. Plus précisément, elle explore comment la masculinité et la féminité se forment à ces moments charnières et quel rôle le féminisme a joué dans les guerres contre l'islam « radical ». En exposant ces relations symbiotiques, Thobani explore comment le retour de la « religion » retravaille les politiques raciales, de genre et sexuelles par lesquelles la société occidentale se définit, et plus spécifiquement, se définit contre l'islam. Contester l'islam, construire la race et la sexualité déballe les orthodoxies conventionnelles et non conventionnelles pour ouvrir de nouveaux espaces dans la façon dont nous pensons à l'identité sexuelle et raciale en Occident et au rôle crucial que l'islam a eu et continue d'avoir dans son développement.

In this paper we use the contemporary example of trans youth panics to introduce the notion of hermeneutical backlash, in which defenders of an established, unjust hermeneutical regime actively work to undermine and discredit hermeneutical liberation. We argue that the strategies and tropes of the trans youth panic illustrate a general propaganda vulnerability of epistemic liberation movements (including familiar examples from recent history), and so are troubling for reasons that go beyond their application to trans youth. This exploration of a few specific cases of hermeneutical liberation and hermeneutical backlash calls attention to the need for further theoretical work on the dynamics of struggles for (and against) hermeneutical justice.

Leading philosophers bring the tools of contemporary epistemology to bear on some of the most pressing social and political questions facing us as agents in the world today. This volume explores a diverse range of topics as they relate to epistemology under broad themes including injustice, race, feminism, sexual consent, and the internet.

Se défendre. Une philosophie de la violence Conférence d’Elsa DORLIN En 1685, le Code noir défendait « aux esclaves de porter aucune arme offensive ni de gros bâtons » sous peine de fouet. Au XIXe siècle, en Algérie, l’État colonial interdisait les armes aux indigènes, tout en accordant aux colons le droit de s’armer. Aujourd’hui, certaines vies comptent si peu que l’on peut tirer dans le dos d’un adolescent noir au prétexte qu’il était « menaçant ». Une ligne de partage oppose historiquement les corps « dignes d’être défendus » à ceux qui, désarmés ou rendus indéfendables, sont laissés sans défense. Ce « désarmement » organisé des subalternes pose directement, pour tout élan de libération, la question du recours à la violence pour sa propre défense. Des résistances esclaves au ju-jitsu des suffragistes, de l’insurrection du ghetto de Varsovie aux Black Panthers ou aux patrouilles queer, Elsa Dorlin retrace une généalogie de l’autodéfense politique. Sous l’histoire officielle de la légitime défense affleurent des « éthiques martiales de soi », pratiques ensevelies où le fait de se défendre en attaquant apparaît comme la condition de possibilité de sa survie comme de son devenir politique. Cette histoire de la violence éclaire la définition même de la subjectivité moderne, telle qu’elle est pensée dans et par les politiques de sécurité contemporaines, et implique une relecture critique de la philosophie politique, où Hobbes et Locke côtoient Frantz Fanon, Michel Foucault, Malcolm X, June Jordan ou Judith Butler.

The literature on epistemic injustice currently displays a logocentric or propositional bias that excludes people with intellectual disabilities from the scope of epistemic agency and the demands of epistemic justice. This paper develops an account of epistemic agency and injustice that is inclusive of both people with and people without intellectual disabilities. I begin by specifying the hitherto undertheorized notion of epistemic agency. I develop a broader, pluralist account of epistemic agency, which relies on a conception of knowledge that accounts not only for propositional knowing, but also for other types of knowing that have been largely neglected in debates on epistemic injustice and agency. Based on this pluralist account of epistemic agency, I then show that people with intellectual disabilities qualify as epistemic agents and therefore as subjects of epistemic justice. Finally, I argue that this pluralist account of epistemic agency pushes us to revisit the current conception of epistemic injustice and to expand its taxonomy in two important ways.

"This is one of the first books to offer a comprehensive philosophical treatment of microaggressions. Its aims are to provide an intersectional analysis of microaggressions that cuts across multiple groups and dimensions of oppression and marginalization, and to engage a variety of perspectives that have been sidelined within the discipline of philosophy. The volume gathers a diverse group of contributors: philosophers of color, philosophers with disabilities, philosophers of various nationalities and ethnicities, and philosophers of several genders and gender identities. Their unique frames of analysis articulate both how the concept of microaggressions can be used to clarify and sharpen our understanding of subtler aspects of oppression and how analysis, expansion, and reconceiving the notion of a microaggression can deepen and extend its explanatory power. The essays in the volume are divided into four thematic parts. The essays in Part I seek to defend microaggressions from common critiques and to explain their impact beyond the context of college students. In Part II the contributors set forth a framework for legitimizing microaggressions research that takes into account issues of measurement, scale, and replication. Part III explores the harms of microaggressions. The chapters show how small slights can accumulate to produce significant harm at the macro level, demonstrate how microaggressions contribute to epistemic harm, and establish novel understandings of racial and accent-triggered microaggressions. Finally, Part IV addresses issues of disability and ableism within the context of microaggressions. It includes commentary on transgender athletes, disciplinary techniques for bodily nonconformity, ableist exceptionalism, and deafness. Microaggressions and Philosophy features cutting-edge research on an important topic that will appeal to a wide range of students and scholars across disciplines. It includes perspectives from philosophy of psychology, empirically informed philosophy, feminist philosophy, critical race theory, disability theory, philosophy of language, philosophy of science, and social and political philosophy"-- Provided by publisher.

This paper is broadly concerned with the question of what epistemic decolonization might involve. It is divided into two parts. The first part begins by explaining the specifically epistemic problem to which calls for epistemic decolonization respond. I suggest that calls for decolonization are motivated by a perceived epistemic crisis consisting in the inadequacy of the dominant Eurocentric paradigm to properly theorize our modern world. I then discuss two general proposals, radical and moderate, for what epistemic decolonization might involve. In the second part, I argue that the inadequacy of Eurocentric epistemic resources constitutes a hermeneutical injustice caused by an irreducible form of epistemic oppression. I then argue that addressing this form of epistemic oppression requires thinking ‘outside’ of the Eurocentric paradigm because the paradigm might fail to reveal and address the epistemic oppression sustaining it. This lends further plausibility to the radical proposal that epistemic decolonization must involve thinking from ‘outside’ the Eurocentric paradigm, but also accommodates the moderate proposal that adopting critical perspectives on Eurocentric thought is an important part of epistemic decolonization.

Despite sustained feminist criticism, the production and consumption of pornography does not show signs of waning. Here, I offer a critical review of the existing feminist anti-pornography debate, arguing that it has largely failed to provide suitable grounds for a stable and comprehensive critique, instead often indirectly providing theoretical resources for pornography to reinvent itself. This is a product, in my view, of a misguided focus on the pornographic object. Feminist critics are better served, I argue, by redirecting their critical gaze towards the consumers of pornography, and, in particular, to the attitudes such consumption reflects. To that end, I introduce an alternative, attitudinal approach that enables criticism of pornography as a reflection of sexist attitudes, as well as for its role in concealing these attitudes.

In this article, I offer an account of an unjust epistemic practice―namely, epistemic appropriation―that harms marginalized knowers through the course of conceptual dissemination and intercommunal uptake. The harm of epistemic appropriation is twofold. First, while epistemic resources developed within the margins gain uptake with dominant audiences, those resources are overtly detached from the marginalized knowers responsible for their production. Second, epistemic resources developed within, but detached from, the margins are utilized in dominant discourses in ways that disproportionately benefit the powerful.

Congdon (2017), Giladi (2018), and McConkey (2004) challenge feminist epistemologists and recognition theorists to come together to analyze epistemic injustice. I take up this challenge by highlighting the failure of recognition in cases of testimonial and hermeneutical injustice experienced by victims of sexual harassment and sexual assault. I offer the #MeToo movement as a case study to demonstrate how the process of mutual recognition makes visible and helps overcome the epistemic injustice suffered by victims of sexual harassment and sexual assault. I argue that in declaring “me too,” the epistemic subject emerges in the context of a polyphonic symphony of victims claiming their status as agents who are able to make sense of their own social experiences and able to convey their knowledge to others.

One of the recent attempts to explore epistemic dimensions of forced displacement focuses on the institution of gender-based asylum and hopes to detect forms of epistemic injustice within assessments of gender related asylum applications. Following this attempt, I aim in this paper to demonstrate how the institution of gender-based asylum is structured to produce epistemic injustice at least in the forms of testimonial injustice and contributory injustice. This structural limit becomes visible when we realize how the institution of asylum is formed to provide legitimacy to the institutional comfort the respective migration courts and boards enjoy. This institutional comfort afforded to migration boards and courts by the existing asylum regimes in the current order of nation-states leads to a systemic prioritization of state actors’ epistemic resources rather than that of applicants, which, in turn, results in epistemic injustice and impacts the determination of applicants’ refugee status.

In Living a Feminist Life Sara Ahmed shows how feminist theory is generated from everyday life and the ordinary experiences of being a feminist at home and at work. Building on legacies of feminist of color scholarship in particular, Ahmed offers a poetic and personal meditation on how feminists become estranged from worlds they critique-often by naming and calling attention to problems-and how feminists learn about worlds from their efforts to transform them. Ahmed also provides her most sustained commentary on the figure of the feminist killjoy introduced in her earlier work while showing how feminists create inventive solutions-such as forming support systems-to survive the shattering experiences of facing the walls of racism and sexism. The killjoy survival kit and killjoy manifesto, with which the book concludes, supply practical tools for how to live a feminist life, thereby strengthening the ties between the inventive creation of feminist theory and living a life that sustains it. https://www.saranahmed.com/

"En 1685, le Code noir défendait " aux esclaves de porter aucunes armes offensives ni de gros bâtons " sous peine de fouet. Au xixe siècle, en Algérie, l'État colonial français interdisait les armes aux indigènes, tout en accordant aux colons le droit de s'armer. Aujourd'hui, certaines vies comptent si peu que l'on peut tirer dans le dos d'un adolescent tout en prétendant qu'il était agressif, armé et menaçant. Une ligne de partage oppose historiquement les corps " dignes d'être défendus " et ceux qui, désarmés ou rendus indéfendables, sont laissés sans défense. Ce " désarmement " organisé des subalternes et des opprimés au profit d'une minorité jouissant d'un droit permanent à porter des armes et à en user impunément pose directement, pour tout élan de libération, la question du recours à la violence pour sa propre défense. Du jiu-jitsu des suffragettes aux pratiques insurrectionnelles du ghetto de Varsovie, des fusils des Black Panthers aux patrouilles queer, Elsa Dorlin retrace une généalogie philosophique de l'autodéfense politique. Derrière l'histoire officielle de la légitime défense, il est ici question du récit des " éthiques martiales de soi ", ces histoires ensevelies où le Sujet ne préexiste pas à sa propre défense, où le fait de se défendre en attaquant apparaît à la fois comme la condition de possibilité d'un soi et la matière des mythologies politiques. Cette histoire - une histoire de la violence - conditionne la définition même de la subjectivité moderne. Elle s'écrit à la lumière d'une relecture critique de l'histoire de la philosophie politique, où Hobbes et Locke sont à confronter avec Franz Fanon, Michel Foucault ou Judith Butler."--Page 1 et 4 de la couverture.

This article analyses the phenomenon of epistemic injustice within contemporary healthcare. We begin by detailing the persistent complaints patients make about their testimonial frustration and hermeneutical marginalization, and the negative impact this has on their care. We offer an epistemic analysis of this problem using Miranda Fricker’s account of epistemic injustice. We detail two types of epistemic injustice, testimonial and hermeneutical, and identify the negative stereotypes and structural features of modern healthcare practices that generate them. We claim that these stereotypes and structural features render ill persons especially vulnerable to these two types of epistemic injustice. We end by proposing five avenues for further work on epistemic injustice in healthcare.

In the era of information and communication, issues of misinformation and miscommunication are more pressing than ever. Epistemic injustice--one of the most important and ground-breaking subjects to have emerged in philosophy in recent years--refers to those forms of unfair treatment that relate to issues of knowledge, understanding, and participation in communicative practices. The Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Injustice is an outstanding reference source to the key topics, problems, and debates in this exciting subject. The first collection of its kind, it comprises over thirty chapters by a team of international contributors, divided into five parts: Core Concepts; Liberatory Epistemologies and Axes of Oppression; Schools of Thought and Subfields within Epistemology; Socio-political, Ethical, and Psychological Dimensions of Knowing; Case Studies of Epistemic Injustice. As well as fundamental topics such as testimonial and hermeneutic injustice and epistemic trust the Handbook includes chapters on important issues such as social and virtue epistemology, objectivity and objectification, implicit bias, and gender and race. Also included are chapters on areas in applied ethics and philosophy, such as law, education, and healthcare. The Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Injustice is essential reading for students and researchers in ethics, epistemology, political philosophy, feminist theory, and philosophy of race. It will also be very useful for those in related fields, such as cultural studies, sociology, education, and law.

This paper will connect literature on epistemic injustice with literature on victims and perpetrators, to argue that in addition to considering the credibility deficit suffered by many victims, we should also consider the credibility excess accorded to many perpetrators. Epistemic injustice, as discussed by Miranda Fricker, considers ways in which someone might be wronged in their capacity as a knower. Testimonial injustice occurs when there is a credibility deficit as a result of identity-prejudicial stereotypes. However, criticisms of Fricker have pointed out that credibility is part of a more complex system that includes both deficits and excesses. I will use these points to argue that we should look closer at sources of credibility excess in cases of sexual assault. This means that in addition to considering sources of victim blaming by looking at ways in which “ideal” victims are constructed, we also need to consider ways in which “ideal” perpetrators are constructed.

Epistemic exploitation occurs when privileged persons compel marginalized persons to educate them about the nature of their oppression. I argue that epistemic exploitation is marked by unrecognized, uncompensated, emotionally taxing, coerced epistemic labor. The coercive and exploitative aspects of the phenomenon are exemplified by the unpaid nature of the educational labor and its associated opportunity costs, the double bind that marginalized persons must navigate when faced with the demand to educate, and the need for additional labor created by the default skepticism of the privileged. I explore the connections between epistemic exploitation and the two varieties of epistemic injustice that Fricker (2007) identifies, testimonial and hermeneutical injustice. I situate epistemic exploitation within Dotson’s (2012; 2014) framework of epistemic oppression, and I address the role that epistemic exploitation plays in maintaining active ignorance and upholding dominant epistemic frameworks.