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One of the recent attempts to explore epistemic dimensions of forced displacement focuses on the institution of gender-based asylum and hopes to detect forms of epistemic injustice within assessments of gender related asylum applications. Following this attempt, I aim in this paper to demonstrate how the institution of gender-based asylum is structured to produce epistemic injustice at least in the forms of testimonial injustice and contributory injustice. This structural limit becomes visible when we realize how the institution of asylum is formed to provide legitimacy to the institutional comfort the respective migration courts and boards enjoy. This institutional comfort afforded to migration boards and courts by the existing asylum regimes in the current order of nation-states leads to a systemic prioritization of state actors’ epistemic resources rather than that of applicants, which, in turn, results in epistemic injustice and impacts the determination of applicants’ refugee status.

My aim in this paper is to introduce a theory of affective labor as byproductive, a concept I develop through analysis of the phenomenology of various affective labor practices in dialog with feminist scholarship, both on gendered and racialized labor, and on affect and emotion. I motivate my theory in the context of literature on affective and emotional labor in philosophy and the social sciences, engaging the post-Marxist literature on affective and immaterial labor and emphasizing feminist critiques. I argue that affective labor is not only the work of producing affects for others to consume or the reproductive work that rejuvenates and sustains labor power and social life, but also the work of metabolizing waste affects and affective byproducts. Thus, byproductive labor is a neologism I develop to bring into view an affective economy and indeed a political economy of affects to the side of the distinction between productive and reproductive labor in its paid and unpaid variants. I make three central claims: (1) affective labor invariably creates byproducts in the embodied subjectivity of the worker; (2) the unique kind of affective expenditure I call “byproductive” (metabolizing affective surplus, containing affective waste, and producing depleted affective agency) is a defining feature of affective labor not circumscribed by the productive-reproductive distinction; and (3) the marginalized forms of subjectivity and depleted agency constituted through the intersections of this labor with hierarchies of gender, race, and migrant status or global class are themselves byproducts of affective labor. Thus, theorizing affective labor as byproductive captures the uniqueness of affective labor and the forms of exploitation unique to it, but also explains the interaction of affective labor with forms of power that operate through subjection and marginalization. © The Author(s) 2018.

In Living a Feminist Life Sara Ahmed shows how feminist theory is generated from everyday life and the ordinary experiences of being a feminist at home and at work. Building on legacies of feminist of color scholarship in particular, Ahmed offers a poetic and personal meditation on how feminists become estranged from worlds they critique-often by naming and calling attention to problems-and how feminists learn about worlds from their efforts to transform them. Ahmed also provides her most sustained commentary on the figure of the feminist killjoy introduced in her earlier work while showing how feminists create inventive solutions-such as forming support systems-to survive the shattering experiences of facing the walls of racism and sexism. The killjoy survival kit and killjoy manifesto, with which the book concludes, supply practical tools for how to live a feminist life, thereby strengthening the ties between the inventive creation of feminist theory and living a life that sustains it. https://www.saranahmed.com/

Cette thèse présente une étude du concept et du phénomène d'imitation, tels qu'ils prennent corps dans la société contemporaine. Parmi les diverses significations comprises dans la notion d'imitation, celle-ci est envisagée ici suivant une définition restreinte, soit en termes de médiation par laquelle le sujet réfléchit l'autre. En ce sens, elle est abordée par le biais du rapport étroit qu'elle entretient avec la relation spéculaire, ou en d'autres mots, avec la dialectique de l'identité et de la différence. Au moyen de cette approche, l'accent est mis sur le caractère symbolique de l'imitation, c'est-à-dire sur sa fonction «médiatisante» et de surcroît, sur le fait qu'elle est engagée dans la réitération du sens plutôt que de la chose en soi. Cette manière de concevoir l'imitation permet de révéler son rôle fondamental dans la formation de soi, de même que dans la reproduction des normes, mœurs et coutumes. C'est à l'aune de cette perspective que la médiation imitative est étudiée en tant que modalité de façonnement individuel par laquelle l'horizon significatif d'une société est réfléchi au sein de la particularité, et objectivé dans un conformisme social. Or, étant donné que le contexte politique de démocratie de masse valorise l'affirmation d'une distinction individuelle au sein du modèle dominant, le conformisme se présente désormais davantage sous la forme d'un « conformisme de la différence ». C'est donc en regard de cette réalité que j'examine les manifestations phénoménales de l'imitation, en considérant la manière dont le conformisme de la différence s'incarne dans la société d'aujourd'hui. Ainsi, j'observe comment l'imitation, comme mode à la fois de reproduction et de différenciation sociales, se décline sur les plans politique, éthique, esthétique, psychologique et philosophique. Pour ce faire, je prends appui sur une méthode au carrefour de l'herméneutique et de la dialectique, et c'est au moyen de celle-ci que je situe historiquement mon interprétation en appréhendant la transformation continuelle du procès mimétique. Cette orientation repose en grande partie sur la démarche proposée par la philosophie hégélienne, bien qu'elle soit également approfondie par d'autres contributions majeures, dont celles de Catherine Malabou, George Herbert Mead, Axel Honneth et Pierre Legendre. Afin d'affirmer toute la pertinence d'une approche sociologique pour penser l'imitation, je montre en fait comment cette dernière est toujours à saisir dans le cours empirique de la vie sociale – significative. ______________________________________________________________________________ MOTS-CLÉS DE L’AUTEUR : Imitation ; ordre symbolique ; formation de soi ; conformisme social ; dialectique identité-altérité ; rapport spéculaire

"En 1685, le Code noir défendait " aux esclaves de porter aucunes armes offensives ni de gros bâtons " sous peine de fouet. Au xixe siècle, en Algérie, l'État colonial français interdisait les armes aux indigènes, tout en accordant aux colons le droit de s'armer. Aujourd'hui, certaines vies comptent si peu que l'on peut tirer dans le dos d'un adolescent tout en prétendant qu'il était agressif, armé et menaçant. Une ligne de partage oppose historiquement les corps " dignes d'être défendus " et ceux qui, désarmés ou rendus indéfendables, sont laissés sans défense. Ce " désarmement " organisé des subalternes et des opprimés au profit d'une minorité jouissant d'un droit permanent à porter des armes et à en user impunément pose directement, pour tout élan de libération, la question du recours à la violence pour sa propre défense. Du jiu-jitsu des suffragettes aux pratiques insurrectionnelles du ghetto de Varsovie, des fusils des Black Panthers aux patrouilles queer, Elsa Dorlin retrace une généalogie philosophique de l'autodéfense politique. Derrière l'histoire officielle de la légitime défense, il est ici question du récit des " éthiques martiales de soi ", ces histoires ensevelies où le Sujet ne préexiste pas à sa propre défense, où le fait de se défendre en attaquant apparaît à la fois comme la condition de possibilité d'un soi et la matière des mythologies politiques. Cette histoire - une histoire de la violence - conditionne la définition même de la subjectivité moderne. Elle s'écrit à la lumière d'une relecture critique de l'histoire de la philosophie politique, où Hobbes et Locke sont à confronter avec Franz Fanon, Michel Foucault ou Judith Butler."--Page 1 et 4 de la couverture.

"The Routledge Companion to Feminist Philosophy is an outstanding guide and reference source to the key topics, subjects, thinkers, and debates in feminist philosophy. Fifty-six chapters, written by an international team of contributors specifically for the Companion, are organized into five sections: (1) Engaging the Past; (2) Mind, Body, and World; (3) Knowledge, Language, and Science; (4) Intersections; (5) Ethics, Politics, and Aesthetics. The volume provides a mutually enriching representation of the several philosophical traditions that contribute to feminist philosophy. It also foregrounds issues of global concern and scope; shows how feminist theory meshes with rich theoretical approaches that start from transgender identities, race and ethnicity, sexuality, disabilities, and other axes of identity and oppression; and highlights the interdisciplinarity of feminist philosophy and the ways that it both critiques and contributes to the whole range of subfields within philosophy."--The publisher.

This article analyses the phenomenon of epistemic injustice within contemporary healthcare. We begin by detailing the persistent complaints patients make about their testimonial frustration and hermeneutical marginalization, and the negative impact this has on their care. We offer an epistemic analysis of this problem using Miranda Fricker’s account of epistemic injustice. We detail two types of epistemic injustice, testimonial and hermeneutical, and identify the negative stereotypes and structural features of modern healthcare practices that generate them. We claim that these stereotypes and structural features render ill persons especially vulnerable to these two types of epistemic injustice. We end by proposing five avenues for further work on epistemic injustice in healthcare.

In the era of information and communication, issues of misinformation and miscommunication are more pressing than ever. Epistemic injustice--one of the most important and ground-breaking subjects to have emerged in philosophy in recent years--refers to those forms of unfair treatment that relate to issues of knowledge, understanding, and participation in communicative practices. The Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Injustice is an outstanding reference source to the key topics, problems, and debates in this exciting subject. The first collection of its kind, it comprises over thirty chapters by a team of international contributors, divided into five parts: Core Concepts; Liberatory Epistemologies and Axes of Oppression; Schools of Thought and Subfields within Epistemology; Socio-political, Ethical, and Psychological Dimensions of Knowing; Case Studies of Epistemic Injustice. As well as fundamental topics such as testimonial and hermeneutic injustice and epistemic trust the Handbook includes chapters on important issues such as social and virtue epistemology, objectivity and objectification, implicit bias, and gender and race. Also included are chapters on areas in applied ethics and philosophy, such as law, education, and healthcare. The Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Injustice is essential reading for students and researchers in ethics, epistemology, political philosophy, feminist theory, and philosophy of race. It will also be very useful for those in related fields, such as cultural studies, sociology, education, and law.

This paper will connect literature on epistemic injustice with literature on victims and perpetrators, to argue that in addition to considering the credibility deficit suffered by many victims, we should also consider the credibility excess accorded to many perpetrators. Epistemic injustice, as discussed by Miranda Fricker, considers ways in which someone might be wronged in their capacity as a knower. Testimonial injustice occurs when there is a credibility deficit as a result of identity-prejudicial stereotypes. However, criticisms of Fricker have pointed out that credibility is part of a more complex system that includes both deficits and excesses. I will use these points to argue that we should look closer at sources of credibility excess in cases of sexual assault. This means that in addition to considering sources of victim blaming by looking at ways in which “ideal” victims are constructed, we also need to consider ways in which “ideal” perpetrators are constructed.

Epistemic exploitation occurs when privileged persons compel marginalized persons to educate them about the nature of their oppression. I argue that epistemic exploitation is marked by unrecognized, uncompensated, emotionally taxing, coerced epistemic labor. The coercive and exploitative aspects of the phenomenon are exemplified by the unpaid nature of the educational labor and its associated opportunity costs, the double bind that marginalized persons must navigate when faced with the demand to educate, and the need for additional labor created by the default skepticism of the privileged. I explore the connections between epistemic exploitation and the two varieties of epistemic injustice that Fricker (2007) identifies, testimonial and hermeneutical injustice. I situate epistemic exploitation within Dotson’s (2012; 2014) framework of epistemic oppression, and I address the role that epistemic exploitation plays in maintaining active ignorance and upholding dominant epistemic frameworks.

Miranda Fricker maintains that testimonial injustice is a matter of credibility deficit, not excess. In this article, I argue that this restricted characterízation of testimonial injustice is too narrow. I introduce a type of identity-prejudicial credibility excess that harms its targets qua knowers and transmitters of knowledge. I show how positive stereotyping and prejudicially inflated credibility assessments contribute to the continued epistemic oppression of marginalized knowers. In particular, I examine harms such as typecasting, compulsory representation, and epistemic exploitation and consider what hearers are obligated to do in response to these injustices. I argue that because epistemic harms to rnarginatized knowers also arise from prejudicially inflated assessments of their credibility, the virtue of testimonial justice must be revised to remedy them.

Over recent decades, poststructuralist theories have allowed critical disability scholars to challenge essentialist understandings of the human species and to contest discourses which divide humans into ‘normal’/‘impaired’ subjects with respect to a wide – and ever expanding – range of corporeal and cognitive traits. For critics, however, these theories are deeply flawed. By focusing primarily on language, poststructuralism shifts our critical attention away from the often harsh material realities of life for disabled people. This has led some to turn to critical realism and to effectively re-essentialise impairment. In this article, I wish to consider an alternative approach. I suggest that the recent ‘ontological turn’ in social theory has seen the emergence of new-materialist approaches – including Deleuze and Guattari’s ontology of assemblage and methodology of assemblage analysis – which allow us to consider disability as a material phenomenon without a return to essentialism.

"Electrifying, provocative, and controversial when first published thirty years ago, Donna Haraway's "Cyborg Manifesto" is even more relevant today, when the divisions that she so eloquently challenges--of human and machine but also of gender, class, race, ethnicity, sexuality, and location--are increasingly complex. The subsequent "Companion Species Manifesto," which further questions the human-nonhuman disjunction, is no less urgently needed in our time of environmental crisis and profound polarization. Manifestly Haraway brings together these momentous manifestos to expose the continuity and ramifying force of Haraway's thought, whose significance emerges with engaging immediacy in a sustained conversation between the author and her long-term friend and colleague Cary Wolfe. Reading cyborgs and companion species through and with each other, Haraway and Wolfe join in a wide-ranging exchange on the history and meaning of the manifestos in the context of biopolitics, feminism, Marxism, human-nonhuman relationships, making kin, literary tropes, material semiotics, the negative way of knowing, secular Catholicism, and more. The conversation ends by revealing the early stages of Haraway's "Chthulucene Manifesto," in tension with the teleologies of the doleful Anthropocene and the exterminationist Capitalocene. Deeply dedicated to a diverse and robust earthly flourishing, Manifestly Haraway promises to reignite needed discussion in and out of the academy about biologies, technologies, histories, and still possible futures."-- Provided by publisher.

Combient y-at-il de sexes? "Deux!", répond l'opinion. "Deux" répond la science. Heureuse concordance : c'est donc que l'opinion a raison, conclura-t-on. Mais est-on si certain que l'opinion et la science disent, sur la question du sexe, la même chose? Quand l'opinion affirme qu'il y a deux sexes, elle soutient qu'il existe, dans chaque espèce, deux types d'individus et seulement deux. Il y aurait alors le masculin et le féminin. Mais quand la science avance qu'il y a deux sexes, que vise-t-elle ? Quelle est, pour un biologiste, la signification des termes "mâle" et "femelle" ? En tentant de compter les sexes, on doit bientôt se risquer à distinguer le normal du pathologique.

Feminism is Queer is an introduction to the intimately related disciplines of gender and queer theory. While guiding the reader through complex theory, the author develops the original position of "queer feminism, " which presents queer theory as continuous with feminist theory. While there have been significant conceptual tensions between second wave feminism and traditional lesbian and gay studies, queer theory offers a paradigm for understanding gender, sex, and sexuality that avoids the conflict in order to develop solidarity among those interested in feminist theory and those interested in lesbian and gay rights. This accessible and comprehensive textbook carefully explains nuanced theoretical terminology and includes extensive suggested further reading to provide the reader with a full andthorough understanding of both disciplines.--Publisher information.

L'étude des mobilisations françaises de l'année 2014-2015 autour de la gynécologie permet d'interroger les différentes manières dont les mouvements féministes se sont saisis de la notion de consentement. Théorisé par les féministes à propos de la sexualité, le consentement est apparu comme un des principes fondateurs d'une morale sexuelle féministe. Les mouvements de 2014, portés par des militantes de la cause des femmes, (ré)introduisent cette notion dans le cabinet médical, et l'appliquent notamment à l'interaction gynécologique. Cela leur permet d'utiliser la loi française de 2002 sur les droits des patient·e·s comme un outil de politisation du cabinet gynécologique et de remise en cause des pratiques et des discours des soignant·e·s à l'égard des femmes.

This dissertation studies the cultural significance of Canadian-American singer/songwriter Rufus Wainwright's (b. 1973) album All Days Are Nights: Songs for Lulu (Decca, 2010). Lulu was written, recorded, and toured in the years surrounding the illness and eventual death of his mother, beloved Quebecoise singer/songwriter Kate McGarrigle. The album, performed as a classical song cycle, stands out amongst Wainwright's musical catalogue as a hybrid composition that mixes classical and popular musical forms and styles. More than merely a collection of songs about death, loss, and personal suffering, Lulu is a vehicle that enabled him to grieve through music. I argue that Wainwright's performativity, as well as the music itself, can be understood as queer, or as that which transgresses traditional or expected boundaries. In this sense, Wainwright's artistic identity and musical trajectory resemble a rhizome, extending in multiple directions and continually expanding to create new paths and outcomes. Instances of queerness reveal themselves in the genre hybridity of the Lulu song cycle, the emotional vulnerability of Wainwright's vocal performance, the deconstruction of gender norms in live performance, and the circulation of affect within the performance space. In this study, I examine the song cycle form, Wainwright's musical score and vocal performance, live performance videos, and fan reactions to live performances in order to identify meaningful moments where Wainwright's musical and performative decisions queer audience expectations. While these musical moments contribute to the already rich and varied lineage of the gay male artist in both classical and popular music, I argue that Wainwright's queer performativity and nontraditional musical choices speak to larger issues important to American culture in the contemporary moment. These issues include the visibility of male public mourning and the healing power of artistic expression in the face of traumatic loss.

La notion de consentement est plus souvent associée aux plaintes pour agression sexuelle qu’aux études et thérapies sexologiques où l’objectif d’une « vie sexuelle satisfaisante » relègue l’idée de contrainte à l’arrière-plan.Dans cet article, nous voulons montrer que, sous l’angle du questionnement sexologique, la notion de consentement recouvre plus que l’accord entre deux personnes quant à un acte ou une relation univoque. Dans la thérapie sexologique, il occupe même une place centrale, tant comme question éthique (qui positionne le thérapeute) que comme contenu de la consultation (comme dessous des plaintes formulées).Une analyse de la littérature médicale fournit des éclairages à l’appui du concept clinique de « consentement pluridimensionnel ». Trois exemples extraits de notre clinique illustrent sa pertinence.Nous suggérons que trois « constantes » soient prises en compte explicitement dans la clinique : la conception du monde, déterminant pour le consultant sa perception d’une « sexualité normale » ; les rapports de pouvoir, s’établissant au sein de tout rapprochement de personnes et la négociation, inévitable perspective pour qu’une quelconque association puisse tenir.L’accès à « une vie sexuelle satisfaisante » passe pour le consultant par l’identification de ce à quoi au juste il a consenti dans le contexte qui fonde sa plainte. Le sexologue l’y aidera par l’attention accordée d’entrée de jeu à ces trois constantes qui forment la charpente du consentement.

Some authors in disability studies have identified limits of both the medical and social models of disability. They have developed an alternative model, which I call the ‘composite model of disability’, to theorise societies’ ableist norms and structures along with the subjective/phenomenological experience of disability. This model maintains that ableist oppression is not the only source of suffering for disabled people: impairment can be as well. From a feminist, queer, trans activist, anti-ableist perspective and using an intersectional, autoethnographic methodology, I apply this composite model of disability to trans identities to consider the potentially ‘debilitating’ aspects of transness. I argue that transness, like disability, has too often been perceived from two perspectives, medical or social, without the benefit of a third option. From a medical perspective, transness is reduced to an individual pathology curable with hormonal/surgical treatments, a conceptualisation that erases structural oppression. From a social point of view, transness is conceptualised as a neutral condition and variation in sex/gender identity. In this model, structural oppression (transphobia/cisgenderism) is seen as the only cause of ‘trans suffering’. I argue that, just as the medical and social models of disability provide limited opportunities for reflection on the complex experience of disability, medical and social understandings of transness, respectively, are insufficient to describe the complexity of trans experience. I explore the possibilities presented by the application of a composite model of disability in trans studies. By both problematising cisgenderist oppression and acknowledging trans people's subjective experiences of suffering through some of the debilitating aspects of transness, this composite model avoids the pitfalls of the medical and social models. The application of tools from disability studies to trans issues uncovers cisnormativity in disability movements and denounces ableism in trans movements. This will, I hope, solidify alliances between these communities and fields of study.