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Drawing on original qualitative research, I argue that the concept of ‘epistemic injustice’ proposed by the feminist philosopher Miranda Fricker, and located within a long genealogy of Black feminist scholarship, can be used sociologically to help understand the lived experiences of asexual people. I show how participants’ accounts of their asexual subjectivities were frequently denied, dismissed and over-written. However, I argue that these experiences were heavily gendered, in that asexual women were subject to epistemic injustices to a degree and in ways that their male counterparts were not, and that this must be understood within the power relations of hetero-patriarchy. These epistemic injustices revolved around old yet prevailing constructions of femininity and womanhood as ‘naturally’ asexual, passive, and lacking agency. When asexual men experienced epistemic injustice, this was rooted in familiar understandings of masculinity as necessitating an active and desiring sexuality. Using Fricker’s elucidation of hermeneutical and testimonial forms of epistemic injustice, I show how asexuality remains a culturally unfamiliar hermeneutical frame in a context of ‘compulsory sexuality’ but also how stories of asexuality are ‘heard’ based on the gendered (and unequal) distribution of testimonial credibility.

Two decades ago, Tarana Burke started using the phrase ‘me too’ to release victims of sexual abuse and rape from their shame and to empower girls from minority communities. In 2017, actress Alyssa Milano made the hashtag #MeToo go viral. This article’s concern is with the role of testimonial practices in the context of sexual violence. While many feminists have claimed that the word of those who claim to being sexually violated by others (should) have political and/or epistemic priority, others have failed to recognize the harm and injury of instances of sexual violence that are not yet acknowledged as such and failed to listen to victims from marginalized social groups. In fact, some feminists have attacked #MeToo for mingling accounts of ‘proper’ sexual violence and accounts that are not ‘proper’ experiences of sexual violence. My aim in this article is to show why this critique is problematic and find a philosophically fruitful way to understand the #MeToo-movement as a movement that strives for moral and conceptual progress.

The settler state's taking of Indigenous children into care disrupts their communities and continues destructive, assimilationist policies. This article presents the perceptions of lawyers, social workers and judges of how Indigenous parents experience child welfare in Quebec. Our participants characterized those experiences negatively. Barriers of language and culture as well as mistrust impede meaningful participation. Parents experience epistemic injustice, wronged in their capacity as knowers. Mistrust also hampers efforts to include Indigenous workers in the system. Emphasizing state workers’ ignorance of Indigenous family practices and the harms of settler colonialism, participants called for greater training. But critical literature on professional education signals the limits of such training to change institutions. Our findings reinforce the jurisdictional calls away from improving the system towards empowering Indigenous peoples to run services of child welfare. The patterns detected and theoretical resources used are relevant to researchers of other institutions that interact with vulnerable populations.

L’Amérique du Sud est un des coeurs battants du féminisme contemporain. Des millions de femmes y prennent la rue contre les féminicides, les violences qui frappent les minorités de race et de genre, les lois qui répriment l’avortement et le développement néo-extractiviste. Figure majeure du féminisme latino-américain, Verónica Gago réinscrit ces bouleversements dans l’émergence d’une internationale féministe et propose, avec La puissance féministe, un antidote à tous les discours de culpabilité et de victimisation. En se réappropriant l’arme classique de la grève, en construisant un féminisme populaire, radical et inclusif, les mouvements sud-américains ont initié une véritable révolution. C’est à partir de l’expérience de ces luttes que Gago reconceptualise la question du travail domestique et de la reproduction sociale, expose les limites du populisme de gauche et dialogue avec Spinoza, Marx, Luxemburg ou Federici. Parce qu’il unit la verve politique du manifeste aux ambitions conceptuelles de la théorie, La puissance féministe est un livre majeur pour saisir la portée internationale du féminisme aujourd’hui.

In this paper we use the contemporary example of trans youth panics to introduce the notion of hermeneutical backlash, in which defenders of an established, unjust hermeneutical regime actively work to undermine and discredit hermeneutical liberation. We argue that the strategies and tropes of the trans youth panic illustrate a general propaganda vulnerability of epistemic liberation movements (including familiar examples from recent history), and so are troubling for reasons that go beyond their application to trans youth. This exploration of a few specific cases of hermeneutical liberation and hermeneutical backlash calls attention to the need for further theoretical work on the dynamics of struggles for (and against) hermeneutical justice.

Leading philosophers bring the tools of contemporary epistemology to bear on some of the most pressing social and political questions facing us as agents in the world today. This volume explores a diverse range of topics as they relate to epistemology under broad themes including injustice, race, feminism, sexual consent, and the internet.

The literature on epistemic injustice currently displays a logocentric or propositional bias that excludes people with intellectual disabilities from the scope of epistemic agency and the demands of epistemic justice. This paper develops an account of epistemic agency and injustice that is inclusive of both people with and people without intellectual disabilities. I begin by specifying the hitherto undertheorized notion of epistemic agency. I develop a broader, pluralist account of epistemic agency, which relies on a conception of knowledge that accounts not only for propositional knowing, but also for other types of knowing that have been largely neglected in debates on epistemic injustice and agency. Based on this pluralist account of epistemic agency, I then show that people with intellectual disabilities qualify as epistemic agents and therefore as subjects of epistemic justice. Finally, I argue that this pluralist account of epistemic agency pushes us to revisit the current conception of epistemic injustice and to expand its taxonomy in two important ways.

"This is one of the first books to offer a comprehensive philosophical treatment of microaggressions. Its aims are to provide an intersectional analysis of microaggressions that cuts across multiple groups and dimensions of oppression and marginalization, and to engage a variety of perspectives that have been sidelined within the discipline of philosophy. The volume gathers a diverse group of contributors: philosophers of color, philosophers with disabilities, philosophers of various nationalities and ethnicities, and philosophers of several genders and gender identities. Their unique frames of analysis articulate both how the concept of microaggressions can be used to clarify and sharpen our understanding of subtler aspects of oppression and how analysis, expansion, and reconceiving the notion of a microaggression can deepen and extend its explanatory power. The essays in the volume are divided into four thematic parts. The essays in Part I seek to defend microaggressions from common critiques and to explain their impact beyond the context of college students. In Part II the contributors set forth a framework for legitimizing microaggressions research that takes into account issues of measurement, scale, and replication. Part III explores the harms of microaggressions. The chapters show how small slights can accumulate to produce significant harm at the macro level, demonstrate how microaggressions contribute to epistemic harm, and establish novel understandings of racial and accent-triggered microaggressions. Finally, Part IV addresses issues of disability and ableism within the context of microaggressions. It includes commentary on transgender athletes, disciplinary techniques for bodily nonconformity, ableist exceptionalism, and deafness. Microaggressions and Philosophy features cutting-edge research on an important topic that will appeal to a wide range of students and scholars across disciplines. It includes perspectives from philosophy of psychology, empirically informed philosophy, feminist philosophy, critical race theory, disability theory, philosophy of language, philosophy of science, and social and political philosophy"-- Provided by publisher.

This paper is broadly concerned with the question of what epistemic decolonization might involve. It is divided into two parts. The first part begins by explaining the specifically epistemic problem to which calls for epistemic decolonization respond. I suggest that calls for decolonization are motivated by a perceived epistemic crisis consisting in the inadequacy of the dominant Eurocentric paradigm to properly theorize our modern world. I then discuss two general proposals, radical and moderate, for what epistemic decolonization might involve. In the second part, I argue that the inadequacy of Eurocentric epistemic resources constitutes a hermeneutical injustice caused by an irreducible form of epistemic oppression. I then argue that addressing this form of epistemic oppression requires thinking ‘outside’ of the Eurocentric paradigm because the paradigm might fail to reveal and address the epistemic oppression sustaining it. This lends further plausibility to the radical proposal that epistemic decolonization must involve thinking from ‘outside’ the Eurocentric paradigm, but also accommodates the moderate proposal that adopting critical perspectives on Eurocentric thought is an important part of epistemic decolonization.

« La psychanalyse est face à un choix historique sans précédent : soit elle continue à travailler avec l'ancienne épistémologie de la différence sexuelle et légitime de facto le régime patriarco-colonial qui la soutient, devenant ainsi responsable des violences qu'elle produit, soit elle s'ouvre à un processus de critique politique de ses discours et de ses pratiques. Continuer à pratiquer la psychanalyse en utilisant la notion de différence sexuelle, avec des instruments cliniques comme le complexe d'OEdipe, est aussi aberrant que de prétendre la terre plate. Le temps est venu de sortir les divans sur les places, collectiviser la parole, politiser les corps, débinariser la sexualité et décoloniser l'inconscient : la survie de la psychanalyse est à ce prix. »-- Quatrième de couverture.

In this article, I offer an account of an unjust epistemic practice―namely, epistemic appropriation―that harms marginalized knowers through the course of conceptual dissemination and intercommunal uptake. The harm of epistemic appropriation is twofold. First, while epistemic resources developed within the margins gain uptake with dominant audiences, those resources are overtly detached from the marginalized knowers responsible for their production. Second, epistemic resources developed within, but detached from, the margins are utilized in dominant discourses in ways that disproportionately benefit the powerful.

Comprendre les violences faites aux femmes dans le couple c'est aussi analyser les luttes, les politiques publiques et les actions concrètes déployées en France aujourd'hui. Ce livre prend appui sur une enquête ethnographique menée auprès d'associations spécialisées (souvent membres de la Fédération nationale solidarité femmes), de femmes victimes, de professionnels de nombreuses institutions concernées (justice, police, travail social...) et de personnalités politiques et universitaires actifs sur ces sujets. S'adressant aux universitaires ainsi qu'aux professionnels, l'ouvrage décrit la construction de la cause des violences conjugales, ainsi que les politiques publiques mises en œuvre, dans une démarche sociohistorique. Il met ainsi en lumière la porosité des espaces militant, universitaire et institutionnel. L'analyse des carrières militantes et professionnelles, la prise en compte des parcours des femmes rencontrées et du contexte du nouveau management public structurant l'action publique, enrichissent la compréhension du travail social féministe mis en œuvre dans les structures d'accueil et d'hébergement des femmes victimes de violences conjugales et de leurs enfants. Cette recherche sociologique éclaire alors des engagements féministes professionnels trop peu connus, face au paradoxe d'un intérêt politique fort pour lutter contre des violences masculines toujours persistantes.

Congdon (2017), Giladi (2018), and McConkey (2004) challenge feminist epistemologists and recognition theorists to come together to analyze epistemic injustice. I take up this challenge by highlighting the failure of recognition in cases of testimonial and hermeneutical injustice experienced by victims of sexual harassment and sexual assault. I offer the #MeToo movement as a case study to demonstrate how the process of mutual recognition makes visible and helps overcome the epistemic injustice suffered by victims of sexual harassment and sexual assault. I argue that in declaring “me too,” the epistemic subject emerges in the context of a polyphonic symphony of victims claiming their status as agents who are able to make sense of their own social experiences and able to convey their knowledge to others.

One of the recent attempts to explore epistemic dimensions of forced displacement focuses on the institution of gender-based asylum and hopes to detect forms of epistemic injustice within assessments of gender related asylum applications. Following this attempt, I aim in this paper to demonstrate how the institution of gender-based asylum is structured to produce epistemic injustice at least in the forms of testimonial injustice and contributory injustice. This structural limit becomes visible when we realize how the institution of asylum is formed to provide legitimacy to the institutional comfort the respective migration courts and boards enjoy. This institutional comfort afforded to migration boards and courts by the existing asylum regimes in the current order of nation-states leads to a systemic prioritization of state actors’ epistemic resources rather than that of applicants, which, in turn, results in epistemic injustice and impacts the determination of applicants’ refugee status.

« Si la violence conjugale est aujourd'hui reconnue comme une question de société légitime, il n'en a pas toujours été ainsi. C'est grâce aux mobilisations féministes des années 1970, qui définissent alors la violence dans le couple comme une violence faite aux femmes - produit des rapports de domination entre les hommes et les femmes -, que ce phénomène est sorti de la dénégation sociale dans laquelle il était tenu. Comment une cause féministe devient-elle un problème public dont s'emparent les associations, les institutions internationales et l'État ? À travers la question des violences conjugales et en comparant des cas français et américain, à Paris et à Los Angeles, Pauline Delage analyse avec acuité quelles sont, de part et d'autre de l'Atlantique, les formes légitimes de l'intervention publique dans le domaine de l'intime et des inégalités sexuées. » -- Résumé de l'éditeur.

This article analyses the phenomenon of epistemic injustice within contemporary healthcare. We begin by detailing the persistent complaints patients make about their testimonial frustration and hermeneutical marginalization, and the negative impact this has on their care. We offer an epistemic analysis of this problem using Miranda Fricker’s account of epistemic injustice. We detail two types of epistemic injustice, testimonial and hermeneutical, and identify the negative stereotypes and structural features of modern healthcare practices that generate them. We claim that these stereotypes and structural features render ill persons especially vulnerable to these two types of epistemic injustice. We end by proposing five avenues for further work on epistemic injustice in healthcare.

In the era of information and communication, issues of misinformation and miscommunication are more pressing than ever. Epistemic injustice--one of the most important and ground-breaking subjects to have emerged in philosophy in recent years--refers to those forms of unfair treatment that relate to issues of knowledge, understanding, and participation in communicative practices. The Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Injustice is an outstanding reference source to the key topics, problems, and debates in this exciting subject. The first collection of its kind, it comprises over thirty chapters by a team of international contributors, divided into five parts: Core Concepts; Liberatory Epistemologies and Axes of Oppression; Schools of Thought and Subfields within Epistemology; Socio-political, Ethical, and Psychological Dimensions of Knowing; Case Studies of Epistemic Injustice. As well as fundamental topics such as testimonial and hermeneutic injustice and epistemic trust the Handbook includes chapters on important issues such as social and virtue epistemology, objectivity and objectification, implicit bias, and gender and race. Also included are chapters on areas in applied ethics and philosophy, such as law, education, and healthcare. The Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Injustice is essential reading for students and researchers in ethics, epistemology, political philosophy, feminist theory, and philosophy of race. It will also be very useful for those in related fields, such as cultural studies, sociology, education, and law.

This paper will connect literature on epistemic injustice with literature on victims and perpetrators, to argue that in addition to considering the credibility deficit suffered by many victims, we should also consider the credibility excess accorded to many perpetrators. Epistemic injustice, as discussed by Miranda Fricker, considers ways in which someone might be wronged in their capacity as a knower. Testimonial injustice occurs when there is a credibility deficit as a result of identity-prejudicial stereotypes. However, criticisms of Fricker have pointed out that credibility is part of a more complex system that includes both deficits and excesses. I will use these points to argue that we should look closer at sources of credibility excess in cases of sexual assault. This means that in addition to considering sources of victim blaming by looking at ways in which “ideal” victims are constructed, we also need to consider ways in which “ideal” perpetrators are constructed.

Epistemic exploitation occurs when privileged persons compel marginalized persons to educate them about the nature of their oppression. I argue that epistemic exploitation is marked by unrecognized, uncompensated, emotionally taxing, coerced epistemic labor. The coercive and exploitative aspects of the phenomenon are exemplified by the unpaid nature of the educational labor and its associated opportunity costs, the double bind that marginalized persons must navigate when faced with the demand to educate, and the need for additional labor created by the default skepticism of the privileged. I explore the connections between epistemic exploitation and the two varieties of epistemic injustice that Fricker (2007) identifies, testimonial and hermeneutical injustice. I situate epistemic exploitation within Dotson’s (2012; 2014) framework of epistemic oppression, and I address the role that epistemic exploitation plays in maintaining active ignorance and upholding dominant epistemic frameworks.

Miranda Fricker maintains that testimonial injustice is a matter of credibility deficit, not excess. In this article, I argue that this restricted characterízation of testimonial injustice is too narrow. I introduce a type of identity-prejudicial credibility excess that harms its targets qua knowers and transmitters of knowledge. I show how positive stereotyping and prejudicially inflated credibility assessments contribute to the continued epistemic oppression of marginalized knowers. In particular, I examine harms such as typecasting, compulsory representation, and epistemic exploitation and consider what hearers are obligated to do in response to these injustices. I argue that because epistemic harms to rnarginatized knowers also arise from prejudicially inflated assessments of their credibility, the virtue of testimonial justice must be revised to remedy them.