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The literature on epistemic injustice currently displays a logocentric or propositional bias that excludes people with intellectual disabilities from the scope of epistemic agency and the demands of epistemic justice. This paper develops an account of epistemic agency and injustice that is inclusive of both people with and people without intellectual disabilities. I begin by specifying the hitherto undertheorized notion of epistemic agency. I develop a broader, pluralist account of epistemic agency, which relies on a conception of knowledge that accounts not only for propositional knowing, but also for other types of knowing that have been largely neglected in debates on epistemic injustice and agency. Based on this pluralist account of epistemic agency, I then show that people with intellectual disabilities qualify as epistemic agents and therefore as subjects of epistemic justice. Finally, I argue that this pluralist account of epistemic agency pushes us to revisit the current conception of epistemic injustice and to expand its taxonomy in two important ways.
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"This is one of the first books to offer a comprehensive philosophical treatment of microaggressions. Its aims are to provide an intersectional analysis of microaggressions that cuts across multiple groups and dimensions of oppression and marginalization, and to engage a variety of perspectives that have been sidelined within the discipline of philosophy. The volume gathers a diverse group of contributors: philosophers of color, philosophers with disabilities, philosophers of various nationalities and ethnicities, and philosophers of several genders and gender identities. Their unique frames of analysis articulate both how the concept of microaggressions can be used to clarify and sharpen our understanding of subtler aspects of oppression and how analysis, expansion, and reconceiving the notion of a microaggression can deepen and extend its explanatory power. The essays in the volume are divided into four thematic parts. The essays in Part I seek to defend microaggressions from common critiques and to explain their impact beyond the context of college students. In Part II the contributors set forth a framework for legitimizing microaggressions research that takes into account issues of measurement, scale, and replication. Part III explores the harms of microaggressions. The chapters show how small slights can accumulate to produce significant harm at the macro level, demonstrate how microaggressions contribute to epistemic harm, and establish novel understandings of racial and accent-triggered microaggressions. Finally, Part IV addresses issues of disability and ableism within the context of microaggressions. It includes commentary on transgender athletes, disciplinary techniques for bodily nonconformity, ableist exceptionalism, and deafness. Microaggressions and Philosophy features cutting-edge research on an important topic that will appeal to a wide range of students and scholars across disciplines. It includes perspectives from philosophy of psychology, empirically informed philosophy, feminist philosophy, critical race theory, disability theory, philosophy of language, philosophy of science, and social and political philosophy"-- Provided by publisher.
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Dans le débat public, être décolonial est une infamie. Dans les universités, dans les partis de gauche et d'extrême gauche, les syndicats, les associations féministes, partout on traque une "pensée décoloniale" infiltrée et funeste pour le vivre-ensemble. Dans ce livre, Françoise Vergès élucide l'objet du scandale. Le féminisme décolonial révèle les impensés de la bonne conscience blanche ; il se situe du point de vue des femmes racisées : celles qui, travailleuses domestiques, nettoient le monde ; il dénonce un capitalisme foncièrement racial et patriarcal. Ces pages incisives proposent un autre récit du féminisme et posent toutes les questions qui fâchent : quelles alliances avec les femmes blanches? Quelle solidarité avec les hommes racisés? Quelles sont les premières vies menacées par le capitalisme racial? Pourquoi les néofascismes s'attaquent-ils aux femmes racisées? Ce livre est une invitation à renouer avec la puissance utopique du féminisme, c'est-à-dire avec un imaginaire à même de porter une transformation radicale de la société.
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In this exploration of new territory between ethics and epistemology, Miranda Fricker argues that there is a distinctively epistemic type of injustice, in which someone is wronged specifically in their capacity as a knower. Justice is one of the oldest and most central themes in philosophy, but in order to reveal the ethical dimension of our epistemic practices the focus must shift to injustice. Fricker adjusts the philosophical lens so that we see through to the negative space that is epistemic injustice. The book explores two different types of epistemic injustice, each driven by a form of prejudice, and from this exploration comes a positive account of two corrective ethical-intellectual virtues. The characterization of these phenomena casts light on many issues, such as social power, prejudice, virtue, and the genealogy of knowledge, and it proposes a virtue epistemological account of testimony. In this ground-breaking book, the entanglements of reason and social power are traced in a new way, to reveal the different forms of epistemic injustice and their place in the broad pattern of social injustice."--Book cover. Justice is one of the oldest and most central themes of philosophy, but sometimes we would do well to focus instead on injustice. This book argues that there is a distinctively epistemic genus of injustice, in which someone is wronged specifically in their capacity as a knower
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Dans la majorité des sociétés connues, la sexualité apparaît comme un échange asymétrique et non réciproque entre hommes et femmes, une compensation masculine pour une prestation féminine, un paiement qui peut revêtir les formes les plus variées en échange d'une sexualité transformée en service. Comment se fait-il que les hommes, même plongés dans les situations les plus misérables, peuvent se payer le service sexuel d'une femme - alors que non seulement les femmes n'ont pas, sauf exception, cette possibilité mais de plus n' ont même pas droit à leur propre sexualité ?