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Drawing on original qualitative research, I argue that the concept of ‘epistemic injustice’ proposed by the feminist philosopher Miranda Fricker, and located within a long genealogy of Black feminist scholarship, can be used sociologically to help understand the lived experiences of asexual people. I show how participants’ accounts of their asexual subjectivities were frequently denied, dismissed and over-written. However, I argue that these experiences were heavily gendered, in that asexual women were subject to epistemic injustices to a degree and in ways that their male counterparts were not, and that this must be understood within the power relations of hetero-patriarchy. These epistemic injustices revolved around old yet prevailing constructions of femininity and womanhood as ‘naturally’ asexual, passive, and lacking agency. When asexual men experienced epistemic injustice, this was rooted in familiar understandings of masculinity as necessitating an active and desiring sexuality. Using Fricker’s elucidation of hermeneutical and testimonial forms of epistemic injustice, I show how asexuality remains a culturally unfamiliar hermeneutical frame in a context of ‘compulsory sexuality’ but also how stories of asexuality are ‘heard’ based on the gendered (and unequal) distribution of testimonial credibility.

Two decades ago, Tarana Burke started using the phrase ‘me too’ to release victims of sexual abuse and rape from their shame and to empower girls from minority communities. In 2017, actress Alyssa Milano made the hashtag #MeToo go viral. This article’s concern is with the role of testimonial practices in the context of sexual violence. While many feminists have claimed that the word of those who claim to being sexually violated by others (should) have political and/or epistemic priority, others have failed to recognize the harm and injury of instances of sexual violence that are not yet acknowledged as such and failed to listen to victims from marginalized social groups. In fact, some feminists have attacked #MeToo for mingling accounts of ‘proper’ sexual violence and accounts that are not ‘proper’ experiences of sexual violence. My aim in this article is to show why this critique is problematic and find a philosophically fruitful way to understand the #MeToo-movement as a movement that strives for moral and conceptual progress.

The settler state's taking of Indigenous children into care disrupts their communities and continues destructive, assimilationist policies. This article presents the perceptions of lawyers, social workers and judges of how Indigenous parents experience child welfare in Quebec. Our participants characterized those experiences negatively. Barriers of language and culture as well as mistrust impede meaningful participation. Parents experience epistemic injustice, wronged in their capacity as knowers. Mistrust also hampers efforts to include Indigenous workers in the system. Emphasizing state workers’ ignorance of Indigenous family practices and the harms of settler colonialism, participants called for greater training. But critical literature on professional education signals the limits of such training to change institutions. Our findings reinforce the jurisdictional calls away from improving the system towards empowering Indigenous peoples to run services of child welfare. The patterns detected and theoretical resources used are relevant to researchers of other institutions that interact with vulnerable populations.

In this paper we use the contemporary example of trans youth panics to introduce the notion of hermeneutical backlash, in which defenders of an established, unjust hermeneutical regime actively work to undermine and discredit hermeneutical liberation. We argue that the strategies and tropes of the trans youth panic illustrate a general propaganda vulnerability of epistemic liberation movements (including familiar examples from recent history), and so are troubling for reasons that go beyond their application to trans youth. This exploration of a few specific cases of hermeneutical liberation and hermeneutical backlash calls attention to the need for further theoretical work on the dynamics of struggles for (and against) hermeneutical justice.

The literature on epistemic injustice currently displays a logocentric or propositional bias that excludes people with intellectual disabilities from the scope of epistemic agency and the demands of epistemic justice. This paper develops an account of epistemic agency and injustice that is inclusive of both people with and people without intellectual disabilities. I begin by specifying the hitherto undertheorized notion of epistemic agency. I develop a broader, pluralist account of epistemic agency, which relies on a conception of knowledge that accounts not only for propositional knowing, but also for other types of knowing that have been largely neglected in debates on epistemic injustice and agency. Based on this pluralist account of epistemic agency, I then show that people with intellectual disabilities qualify as epistemic agents and therefore as subjects of epistemic justice. Finally, I argue that this pluralist account of epistemic agency pushes us to revisit the current conception of epistemic injustice and to expand its taxonomy in two important ways.

This paper is broadly concerned with the question of what epistemic decolonization might involve. It is divided into two parts. The first part begins by explaining the specifically epistemic problem to which calls for epistemic decolonization respond. I suggest that calls for decolonization are motivated by a perceived epistemic crisis consisting in the inadequacy of the dominant Eurocentric paradigm to properly theorize our modern world. I then discuss two general proposals, radical and moderate, for what epistemic decolonization might involve. In the second part, I argue that the inadequacy of Eurocentric epistemic resources constitutes a hermeneutical injustice caused by an irreducible form of epistemic oppression. I then argue that addressing this form of epistemic oppression requires thinking ‘outside’ of the Eurocentric paradigm because the paradigm might fail to reveal and address the epistemic oppression sustaining it. This lends further plausibility to the radical proposal that epistemic decolonization must involve thinking from ‘outside’ the Eurocentric paradigm, but also accommodates the moderate proposal that adopting critical perspectives on Eurocentric thought is an important part of epistemic decolonization.

Si la critique féministe adressée à la production des savoirs est désormais institutionnalisée et relativement bien implantée en France et au Québec (Lagrave, 1990 ; Parini, 2010), elle n’a cependant affecté qu’à la marge les pratiques de recherches (Ait Ben Lmadani et Moujoud, 2012 ; Mathieu, 1999) A partir de nos positions situées (Hill Collins, 2008 [1990] ; hooks, 2017 [1984], Bilge, 2015), et de notre expérience de recherche sur des sujets minoritaires, nous revenons sur notre expérience commune de l’organisation d’un atelier sur « les féminismes des marges », proposé lors d’un congrès de sciences sociales au Canada. Cette initiative, qui ambitionnait d’interroger les fondements épistémologiques à l’œuvre dans nos disciplines respectives, nous semble constituer un cas limite (Hamidi, 2012) intéressant, pour penser les effets de l’ordre du genre, de la racisation, et des inégalités géopolitiques en matière de production et de valorisation de savoirs « peu légitimes » au sein de l’espace universitaire (Larcher, 2018). A partir d’un dialogue entre nos différentes perspectives, nous avons alors tenté d’élaborer une pensée commune pour dessiner une ligne de crête, sur laquelle pourraient cheminer les « halfies » (Abu Lughod, 1991), qui, comme nous, articulent leur présence dans des espaces de pouvoir avec des positions minoritaires.

Édito

In this article, I offer an account of an unjust epistemic practice―namely, epistemic appropriation―that harms marginalized knowers through the course of conceptual dissemination and intercommunal uptake. The harm of epistemic appropriation is twofold. First, while epistemic resources developed within the margins gain uptake with dominant audiences, those resources are overtly detached from the marginalized knowers responsible for their production. Second, epistemic resources developed within, but detached from, the margins are utilized in dominant discourses in ways that disproportionately benefit the powerful.

À la fin des années 1970, les partisanes états-uniennes de la pédagogie féministe ont mis fortement l’accent sur l’importance de l’expérience dans le processus d’apprentissage, rejoignant en cela une tradition réformatrice de l’éducation portée, entre autres, par Jean-Jacques Rousseau, John Dewey et Paulo Freire. Les féministes libérales considéraient l’éducation comme un moyen pour que les femmes, en tant qu’individus, acquièrent des compétences intellectuelles et le pouvoir de se mobiliser en faveur de l’égalité des droits. Faisant écho à la pensée de Rosa Luxemburg et de Myles Horton, les féministes radicales, pour leur part, placèrent la pédagogie féministe dans le contexte d’une lutte contre l’oppression plus révolutionnaire et collective. Les féministes radicales et socialistes qui délivraient des cours dans l’enseignement supérieur se sont inspirées d’un processus de conscientisation [consciousness-raising] combinant expérience, théorie, action et prise en considération du ressenti. Elles se retrouvèrent alors confrontées au problème de la théorisation et de la pratique de la pédagogie féministe dans un contexte d’institutions hiérarchiques et compétitives. Tout comme le mouvement féministe en général, elles ont dû trouver un moyen pour traiter les différences entre les étudiant·e·s au regard de leurs expériences, de leurs ressentis et de leurs idées au sujet du genre.

Congdon (2017), Giladi (2018), and McConkey (2004) challenge feminist epistemologists and recognition theorists to come together to analyze epistemic injustice. I take up this challenge by highlighting the failure of recognition in cases of testimonial and hermeneutical injustice experienced by victims of sexual harassment and sexual assault. I offer the #MeToo movement as a case study to demonstrate how the process of mutual recognition makes visible and helps overcome the epistemic injustice suffered by victims of sexual harassment and sexual assault. I argue that in declaring “me too,” the epistemic subject emerges in the context of a polyphonic symphony of victims claiming their status as agents who are able to make sense of their own social experiences and able to convey their knowledge to others.

Prenant acte de la rareté des analyses critiques du droit civil au Québec, l'autrice veut contribuer à la recherche dans le domaine du droit en proposant une nouvelle méthodologie féministe. Elle s'appuie sur la théorie du point de vue situé et une prise en considération du pouvoir performatif de la norme de genre (et des rapports sociaux de sexe) sur le droit positif. Ces outils l'amènent à remettre en question des concepts fondamentaux en droit civil et à mieux comprendre le rôle du Code civil du Québec dans la reproduction des rapports sociaux de sexe. De manière plus pratique, l'autrice utilise cette méthodologie pour s'interroger sur le sujet de droit, en droit civil, et la construction apparemment asexuée de catégories telles que celles de "propriétaire" et de "locataire"

One of the recent attempts to explore epistemic dimensions of forced displacement focuses on the institution of gender-based asylum and hopes to detect forms of epistemic injustice within assessments of gender related asylum applications. Following this attempt, I aim in this paper to demonstrate how the institution of gender-based asylum is structured to produce epistemic injustice at least in the forms of testimonial injustice and contributory injustice. This structural limit becomes visible when we realize how the institution of asylum is formed to provide legitimacy to the institutional comfort the respective migration courts and boards enjoy. This institutional comfort afforded to migration boards and courts by the existing asylum regimes in the current order of nation-states leads to a systemic prioritization of state actors’ epistemic resources rather than that of applicants, which, in turn, results in epistemic injustice and impacts the determination of applicants’ refugee status.

Tout au long de son histoire, le féminisme au Brésil s’est caractérisé par une forte hétérogénéité au niveau de sa composition sociale et de ses stratégies politiques. Il est identifié comme un mouvement aux expressions multiples. C’est pourquoi il s’agit d’un « collectif total » au caractère pluriel et hétérogène. Cet article présente quelques réflexions issues d’une recherche exploratoire sur cinq collectifs autonomes brésiliens. Revenant sur le processus d’institutionnalisation et d’« ongéisation », ainsi que sur les liens entre groupes féministes et gouvernements, les auteures analysent le contexte d’émergence d’organisations autonomes et les critiques radicales portées par ces groupes. L’article met en lumière la formation d’une conscience féministe, les formes d’organisation et de représentation politique ainsi que les expressions nouvelles du militantisme au Brésil.

Dans les travaux sociologiques problématisant la pauvreté comme une relation d’assistance, il est courant d’analyser les aidants et/ou les aidés. Il est plus rare d’observer leur interdépendance, en considérant de manière systématique les pratiques par lesquelles chacun tient compte des effets de son action sur l’autre — autrement dit, en considérant leur (plus ou moins grande) réflexivité au cours de la relation d’aide. La perspective philosophique du care invitant à problématiser la réception de l’aide, une sociologie de la réflexivité conduit à observer dans quelle mesure les aidants ajustent l’aide au gré de ses réceptions par les aidés. Cet ajustement varie selon la légitimité et le temps accordés à cette réception par les dispositifs d’assistance. Le cas de l’urgence sociale, destinée aux personnes sans abri définies comme des victimes en détresse, est à ce titre intéressant, en ce que l’ajustement de l’aide y est a priori très faible : les sans-abri sont considérés comme peu lucides sur leur état et comme devant être secourus de façon ponctuelle. Pour décrire les formes diverses de réflexivité observables dans les pratiques d’aide aux sans-abri à Paris entre 2005 et 2015, nous combinons méthode idéale-typique et démarche ethnographique pour éclairer des pratiques d’ajustement inattendues dans une relation d’urgence. Cet article caractérise plus généralement le temps de l’aide comme une épreuve de synchronisation entre production et réception de l’aide.

This article analyses the phenomenon of epistemic injustice within contemporary healthcare. We begin by detailing the persistent complaints patients make about their testimonial frustration and hermeneutical marginalization, and the negative impact this has on their care. We offer an epistemic analysis of this problem using Miranda Fricker’s account of epistemic injustice. We detail two types of epistemic injustice, testimonial and hermeneutical, and identify the negative stereotypes and structural features of modern healthcare practices that generate them. We claim that these stereotypes and structural features render ill persons especially vulnerable to these two types of epistemic injustice. We end by proposing five avenues for further work on epistemic injustice in healthcare.

L’usage du terme "empoderamiento" par le féminisme est étroitement lié à l’importance que l’idée de pouvoir a acquise dans les mouvements sociaux comme dans les théories en sciences sociales. Dans les analyses réalisées par Gramsci, Foucault et Paulo Freire, le pouvoir se définit comme un rapport social historiquement et culturellement déterminé. Même si ces auteurs ne font aucune référence directe au pouvoir inscrit dans les rapports de genre et n’utilisent pas le mot empoderamiento , ou ses équivalents, leurs analyses ont inspiré les réflexions que va développer le Mouvement des femmes. À partir de ce qu’on a appelé la ‘deuxième vague’ du fémi-nisme des années 1970, des groupes apparaissent qui commencent à faire usage du terme empoderamiento ou empowerment et à débattre de sa signification. Son utilisation par le Mouvement des femmes se présente comme une stratégie pour impulser le changement dans la vie quotidienne des femmes et la mise en œuvre d’un processus de transformation dans les structures sociales.

This paper will connect literature on epistemic injustice with literature on victims and perpetrators, to argue that in addition to considering the credibility deficit suffered by many victims, we should also consider the credibility excess accorded to many perpetrators. Epistemic injustice, as discussed by Miranda Fricker, considers ways in which someone might be wronged in their capacity as a knower. Testimonial injustice occurs when there is a credibility deficit as a result of identity-prejudicial stereotypes. However, criticisms of Fricker have pointed out that credibility is part of a more complex system that includes both deficits and excesses. I will use these points to argue that we should look closer at sources of credibility excess in cases of sexual assault. This means that in addition to considering sources of victim blaming by looking at ways in which “ideal” victims are constructed, we also need to consider ways in which “ideal” perpetrators are constructed.